Barn Doors and Missing Horses

[G Gocek <gggman@att.net>]

Tightly regulating lobbying without adopting any restrictions on campaign finance and then expecting resultant policy making more attuned to the public interest seems silly on its face. If special interests can not intervene to exert influence post-election, is there any reason to believe that such efforts will not then focus on getting (and retaining) friendly candidates in positions of power? Currently, if you want to effect outcomes, you can select many points of contact in both the electoral and policy making phases of a legislative career. Future lobbying restrictions would merely front load all action into the campaign season. 

In addition to this evident loophole, it would seem that such bans have dubious constitutional grounds (First Amendment). They definitely also would be most problematic to enforce. 

But fundamentally, will adding more rules to correct the deficiencies of previous regulations really guarantee that "everything is finally done right, for good"? The fact that government can be so intrusive, with virtually any social question subject to a policy answer, seems to be the basis for much dissatisfaction with the legislative process. 

People may clamor "there ought to be a law", but if the enacted legislation is not completely on the mark from a particular voter's perspective, then the loud complaint is raised that "there is something wrong with the system". Compromise is the midwife ever present at the creation of all legislation, so it is virtually impossible for most of the populace to be totally satisfied with any legislative outcome. 

"Lawmaking, like sausage making, is a process the average person would never truly want to see" is an old truism. Perhaps its real message is the preferability of a diet reduced in meat (if not vegetarian). Just like our courts groaning under the weight of too many litigants, might not our legislative halls filled with too many Gucci loafers merely reflect a too quick and universal recourse to the governmental option for some public issues and many private issues masquerading as public ones?

Finally, as to initiatives and referenda, direct public intervention in policymaking is philosophically contrary to representative government. On many public questions, the average citizen lacks the expertise, resources and attention to make a truly considered decision. Arraying too many issues in a rule by plebiscite is demanding a set of forced choices on voters already stressed by multiple demands on their time and talents. In my opinion, term limits are a better way to ensure that special interests do not drive a wedge between a legislator and his constituents. 

For direct popular voice, it may be worth trying a popular veto over fiscal issues. Just as public school finance questions require popular approval, why not allow voters the right to overrule major new tax increases prior to their imposition? Taxation without representation was one of the factors leading to the birth of America. If legislators are indeed voting for special interests when it comes time to pay the public bills, it would seem reasonable to give those who cover the cost the right to judge the propriety of such actions.