Choice 1 No Panacea

[G Gocek <gggman@att.net>]

Choice One could constrain the direct influence of "special interests" in electoral politics. But seeing it as a surefire way to increase the impact of "populistic" preferences in public policymaking is in my view naive. 

"Special interests" are typically driven by financial motivations, with their actions fundamentally dictated by an economic logic. In a government-regulated industry, or one faced by the substantive threat of such, allocating resources to affect policymaking outcomes is considered within the framework of investment decision making. Just like the consideration of expanding capacity, hiring a key executive, merging with another company, etc., a special interest will allocate resources to the point where the incremental benefits from that commitment just marginally exceed their costs.

Under the current electoral rules of the game, campaign contributions are viewed by special interests as one of their options to attain a competitive advantage. People may argue that the "price" for such influence is unreasonably low from a popular standpoint (i.e. the best politician that money can buy is had for a fairly modest amount, considering the potential economic impact of their policymaking choices). 

But denying  "special interests" the electoral finance option does not mean that their motivation to not seek competitive dominance will be consequently eliminated. They are "special interests" for a reason, they have real economic resources to protect. The dimensions of the competition to affect legislation will change, perhaps companies will try to develop the best "post-political career packages" for favored legislators instead of paying for commercials. But as long as government has potentially substantial power of the economic futures of enterprises, it is ludicrous to think that special interests will resign themselves to a hands-off accommodation with whatever results are generated by democratic elections. And since a free-market system is both a fundamental feature of American society and the most effective means to organize economic production and deliver the output yielding the highest standard of living for the most people, "special interest" actors will always be part of the political process.

Government financing of campaigns introduces its set of new problems. Candidates funded by such will by and large undoubtedly be biased towards favoring public sector solutions towards various social problems. Incumbents will still have a sizable built-in advantage as the current dispensers of favors, with little-known challengers needing to spend substantially more than established, known figures simply to get a comparable level of public awareness, something which spending limitations would prevent. Existing political parties could have increased influence, as they have an endowment of ready, in-kind resources (volunteer election workers, etc.) which could be provided outside any established cash spending limits. And ultimately, when has any government program delivered results that are consistently efficient, relevant, and productive over the long run? Remember, US presidential elections have been publicly financed for a number of years, and this year witnessed the allocation of a fair number of tax dollars to Pat Buchanan and the Reform Party. Is this a truly worthy investment to expand public voice or just another boondoggle?

This is not to say that there is nothing to do but hopelessly throw up one's hands in the face of the present system, accept the laissez faire, and just pursue private pursuits beyond politics. These options can be addressed in future discussions on the other options to be covered in this dialogue.