PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

Harrisburg, PA 17105-3265

Public Meeting held June 12, 1997

Commissioners Present:

John M. Quain, Chairman
Robert K. Bloom, Vice Chairman
John Hanger
David W. Rolka
Nora Mead Brownell

Docket No. P-00971177

Petition of Rural and Small Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers for Commission Action pursuant to Section 251(f)(2) and 253(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Docket No. P-00971188

Petition of Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksburg to Intervene in PUC Docket No. P-00971177 and to suspend the Interconnection Requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 pursuant to Sections 251(f)(2) and 253(b)

BY THE COMMISSION:

OPINION AND ORDER

History of the Proceeding

On February 20, 1997, the Petitioners,⁽¹⁾ all small incumbent local exchange carriers serving rural portions of Pennsylvania, filed a Petition under Sections 251(f)(2)⁽²⁾ and 253(b)⁽³⁾ of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA-96)(Petition). The Petition wants the Commission to temporarily suspend the interconnection requirements imposed under Sections 251(b) and (c) of the TA-96.⁽⁴⁾ The Petition also wants the Commission to temporarily suspend the certification of any facilities-based carriers within the respective service territories of any Petitioner that has a modernization plan approved under Chapter 30. The Petition was not served on any competitive local exchange carrier (CLECs). The Petition was docketed at P-00971177.

On March 13, 1997 Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksberg⁽⁵⁾ filed a Petition to intervene. Citizens wants suspension or modification of its interconnection obligations under Section 251(f)(2) and 253(b) of the TA-96. The Citizens Petition was not served on any current CLECs. The Citizens Petition was docketed at P-00971188. Docket No. P-00971177 and P-00971188 are hereby consolidated for purposes of consideration in this Opinion and Order.

On April 5, 1997, the Commission published a notice in 27 Pa. B. 14 notifying the public and soliciting comments on the Petitions. The deadline for comments was April 14, 1997. The deadline for reply comments was April 21, 1997.

On April 14, 1997, comments were filed by AT&T Communications of Pennsylvania, Inc. (AT&T), MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI), Armstrong Communications, Inc. (Armstrong), Bentleyville Telephone Company (Bentleyville), Helicon Telephone Company (Helicon),⁽⁶⁾ Yukon Waltz Telephone Company (Yukon), and the Pennsylvania Cable & Television Communications Association (PCTA). On April 21, 1997 reply comments were filed by the PCTA, Citizens, and Helicon Telephone. Late Reply Comments were filed by Petitioners and, on May 21, 1997, by Sprint Spectrum L.P. d/b/a Sprint PCS.⁽⁷⁾

On July 8, 1997, Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc. filed comments in opposition to the Petition. Vanguard claimed that lack of service prevented the earlier filing of comments.

Analysis and Disposition

Summary of Disposition. We must address two issues in this consolidated proceeding. The first is whether to grant the Intervention Petitions of Citizens and Helicon. Section 5.72 generally allows for intervention by persons pursuant to right, if they have an interest which might be affected by the proceeding, or if they have an interest of such nature that their participation is in the public interest.⁽⁸⁾ We conclude that intervention is warranted given the questions the intervenors raise concerning the interplay of Section 251(f)(2) relief with Section 251(f)(1).

The second issue is whether any of the Petitioners warrant any Section 251(f)(2) suspension or modification of the interconnection obligations imposed on them under Section 251(b) or (c) of TA-96.

We conclude that a limited 2-year suspension, with an option to secure up to three additional 1-year extensions, is appropriate for all Petitioners except ALLTEL, Bentleyville, and Citizens. We deny ALLTEL's request, without prejudice, in light of ALLTEL's size and customer service territory compared to the other Petitioners. We also deny, without prejudice, Bentleyville and Citizens' request because their request raises questions about the interplay of Section 251(f)(1) and 251(f)(2) that are beyond the narrow scope of the relief requested by all the other Petitioners.

We reject the Petitioners' request for relief from facilities-based competition under Section 253(b). Section 253(b) relief is beyond that needed under Section 251(f)(2). The request is also premised on Petitioners' promise to perform an obligation already required under state law.

In order to prevent unnecessary and duplicative litigation, we will stay any pending Section 251(b) or (c) interconnection requests involving ALLTEL, Bentleyville, and Citizens, as permitted by Section 251(f)(2), pending final resolution of their Section 251(f)(2) status. However, ALLTEL, Bentleyville and Citizens must initiate a proceeding seeking Section 251(f)(2) relief within 30 days from entry of this Order in order to secure that temporary stay.

We believe this decision is consistent with TA-96. We further believe that our decision avoids challenges to Chapter 30 as a barrier to competition under Section 253(a) of TA-96. However, any Section 251(f)(2) relief is premised on Petitioners' filing alternative regulation and network modernization plans under Chapter 30 and deployment of an advanced telecommunications network available to the public schools, libraries, and other public facilities in rural Pennsylvania. The Petitioners' failure to comply with these conditions may result in revocation of any Section 251(f)(2) relief provided by this Commission. Our reasoning is set forth in more detail below.

The Intervention Petitions. Both Helicon and Citizens want to intervene for similar reasons. Helicon is concerned that any Section 251(f)(2) relief provided to Bentleyville will directly impact Helicon's interest in pending litigation.⁽⁹⁾ Citizens wants to secure Section 251(f)(2) relief even as it litigates interconnection requests with Armstrong Communications.⁽¹⁰⁾

Bentleyville opposes Helicon's intervention. Bentleyville claims that Helicon raises video programming questions outside the requested relief, that Bentleyville is entitled to Section 251(f)(2) relief notwithstanding any video programming questions, and that Helicon's questions concerning Bentleyville's video programming operations are better addressed in another proceeding.⁽¹¹⁾

Armstrong opposes Citizens intervention. Armstrong claims that Citizens commenced its video programming service operations after enactment of TA-96 and that Citizens request violates Sections 251(f)(1)(C) and 252(b)(5) of TA-96.⁽¹²⁾

The Petitioners oppose the intervention petitions.⁽¹³⁾ The Petitioners claim that Citizens is wrongfully using this proceeding to press its Section 251(f)(1) claims. The Petitioners also claim that Helicon's intervention is wrongfully premised on a misreading of TA-96 and the facts as they pertain to Bentleyville.⁽¹⁴⁾

The Commission's rules at 52 Pa.Code §5.72 provide, in relevant part, as follows:

§5.72 Eligibility to Intervene.

(a) Persons. A petition to intervene may be filed by a person claiming a right to intervene or an interest of such nature that intervention is necessary or appropriate to the administration of the statute under which the proceeding is brought. The right or interest may be of the following:

(1) A right conferred by statute of the United States or of the Commonwealth.

(2) An interest which may be directly affected and which is not adequately represented by existing participants and as to which the petitioner may be bound by the actions of the Commission in the proceeding.

(3) Another interest of such nature that participation of the petitioner may be in the public interest.

Helicon has a direct interest to the extent that any decision concerning Bentleyville directly impacts current litigation. Helicon's concerns also raise questions involving the public interest. Consequently, Helicon's intervention is granted.

Citizens' intervention petition comes within Section 5.72(a)(1) through (3). Citizens has a right under TA-96 to request Section 251(f)(2) relief. Citizens also has a direct interest to the extent that any Section 251(f)(2) relief in this case could directly impact Citizens' request for similar relief. Citizens' questions about Section 251(f)(1) and (f)(2) of TA-96 are matters of public interest. Consequently, Citizens' intervention is granted.

The Petition. Section 251 of TA-96 governs interconnection. Section 251(a) imposes general duties on telecommunications carriers.⁽¹⁵⁾ Section 251(b) imposes specific duties regarding resale, number portability, dialing parity, access to rights-of-way, and reciprocal compensation. Section 251(c) imposes additional duties regarding negotiation, interconnection, unbundling, resale, changes and collocation. Section 251(f) provides for exemption, suspension, and modifications of these Section 251(b) and (c) duties.⁽¹⁶⁾

Section 251(f)(1) provides an exemption from the Section 251(c) obligations for rural local exchange companies (LECs). There is, however, an exception to the exemption for rural video programming service providers. The first sentence of Section 251(f)(1)(C) removes the exemption for rural video programming service providers; the second sentence then renders that exception invalid if a rural LEC was providing video programming services on the date of enactment of TA-96.

Section 251(f)(2) allows a state commission to suspend or modify the Section 251(b) or (c) obligations for any LEC with less than 2% of the nation's access lines in the aggregate nationwide. The Petitioners seek a Section 251(f)(2) suspension.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has since issued three final Report and Orders implementing the TA-96. These FCC Orders, collectively referred to as the Federal Trilogy, focus on the interconnection requirements of Sections 251(b) and (c), universal service, and access charge and reform.⁽¹⁷⁾

The Petitioners want the Commission: (i) to suspend the interconnection requirements of Sections 251(b) and 251(c) of the TA-96; and (ii) to suspend the certification of facilities-based carriers within their respective service territories upon approval of a Chapter 30 network modernization plan.⁽¹⁸⁾

Section 251(f)(2) of TA-96 provides, in complete part, as follows:

(2) Suspensions and Modifications For Rural Carriers. A local exchange carrier with fewer than 2 percent of the Nation's subscriber lines installed in the aggregate nationwide may petition a State commission for a suspension or modification of the application of a requirement or requirements of subsection (b) or (c) to telephone exchange service facilities specified in such petition. The State commission shall grant such petition to the extent that, and for such duration as, the State commission determines that such suspension or modification --

(A) is necessary --

(i) to avoid a significant adverse economic impact on users of telecommunications services generally;

(ii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is unduly economically burdensome; or

(iii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is technically infeasible; and

(B) is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.

The State commission shall act upon any petition filed under this paragraph within 180 days after receiving such petition. Pending such action, the State commission may suspend enforcement of the requirement or requirements to which the petition applies with respect to the petitioning carrier or carriers.

The Petitioners allege that competition in their less densely populated service areas, given the higher per-unit costs and lower volume users, makes high-volume rural customers especially vulnerable to "cream-skimming." The Petitioners also allege that cream skimming will cause those high-volume rural customers to abandon the Petitioners' networks. The end result will be higher prices and negative impacts to universal service.⁽¹⁹⁾

The Petitioners also allege that favorable action by the Commission enables everyone to avoid significant litigation costs associated with TA-96. They further claim that an immediate move to competition will result in higher prices, a lessened quality of service, and little deployment of the advanced telecommunications network envisioned by TA-96 and Chapter 30. Finally, they claim that denial of any relief is contrary to the purposes of the TA-96, maintenance of universal service and ensuring the availability of advanced services and facilities through competition.⁽²⁰⁾

The Petitioners ask the Commission to: 1) immediately suspend, pursuant to Section 251(f)(2), the interconnection requirements of Sections 251(b) and 251(c) pending final action on the Petition; and 2) temporarily suspend for at least 24 months, pending final action in the Federal Trilogy on Universal Service rules and access charge reform, the interconnection requirements of Sections 251(b) and (c).⁽²¹⁾

The Petitioners further promise, if the Commission grants the requested relief, to make Chapter 30 filings pursuant to Sections 3003 and 3006 of the Public Utility Code on or before July 8, 1998. In the alternative, Petitioners promise to file statements with supporting documentation showing why it is not in the best interest of the respective LEC to pursue a Chapter 30 network modernization plan. In exchange, Petitioners seek a 5-year suspension from the certification of any facilities-based local exchange competition in the service territories of LECs that are pursuing network modernization plans.⁽²²⁾

The Petitioners conclude that the relief they seek is sustainable under Section 253(b) of the TA-96. The Petitioners claim that Section 253(b) allows the states to refuse to certify additional carriers in order to provide some protection to those incumbent LECs willing to invest in network modernization programs under Chapter 30.⁽²³⁾

Comments and Reply Comments. The Petitioners filed Comments and Reply Comments to their Petition. They claim that Section 251(f)(2) relief is warranted because no Petitioner provides Section 251(f)(1) video programming services, that any Petitioner providing Section 251(f)(1) video programming services should not get Section 251(f)(2) relief, and that relief is necessary to prevent harm to rural LECs.

The Petitioners' Reply Comments claim that competition is not an end in itself but is a means to promoting deployment of an advanced telecommunications network. The Petitioners also claim that the Commission's denial of any Section 251(f)(2) relief will promote cream skimming and harm universal service. The Petitioners further claim that providing Section 251(f)(2) relief will free up resources that would otherwise be devoted to case-by-case proceedings. Finally, the Petitioners claim that other states have already granted the requested relief, that Petitioners' pleading demonstrate an evidentiary basis to grant a Section 251(f)(2) suspension, and that AT&T misreads the legislative intent of Chapter 30.⁽²⁴⁾

Bentleyville filed supplemental comments. Bentleyville claims that it is a rural LEC providing video programming as of the date of enactment of the TA-96. Bentleyville also claims that it is entitled to the Section 251(f)(2) relief even if it expands its video programming services.⁽²⁵⁾

AT&T and Helicon's comments oppose the Petition. They claim that competition should be available to all local exchange customers under TA-96 and Chapter 30. AT&T goes on to claim that the Petitioners already have all the relief they need in the Section 251(f)(1) exemption. AT&T also claims that the Commission's own procedures implementing TA-96 go well beyond the statutory minimum and that further relief is unnecessary. In addition, AT&T claims that no evidence exists to justify Section 251(f)(2) relief. Finally, AT&T protests the attempt to use Chapter 30 as a shield against competition.⁽²⁶⁾

Helicon's comments focus on Section 251(f)(2) relief in light of Section 251(f)(1). Helicon claims that any rural LEC which provides new or expanded video programming should lose any protection afforded under Section 251(f)(1). Helicon's reply comments claim that no suspension is necessary, that on-the-record proceedings for CLEC applications are unnecessary, and that it might agree to Bentleyville's suggestion about not opposing Helicon's attempt to provide facilities-based competition.⁽²⁷⁾ Sprint PCS agrees with AT&T that the Petitioners have failed to provide the evidence required under Section 251(f)(2) to justify suspension of the Section 251(b) or (c) requirements.

Citizens' reply comments claim that it is entitled to intervene and seek Section 251(f)(2) relief. Citizens also claims that its video programming services are consistent with Section 251(f)(1)(c) of the TA-96.⁽²⁸⁾

MCI does not object to the Petition so long as the requirements of Section 251(a) are not altered. MCI also claims that no relief should be greater than two years.⁽²⁹⁾

The OCA opposes the Section 251(f)(2) request. The OCA claims that relief is unnecessary, unwarranted by the evidence, and opens up the possibility that Chapter 30 could be pre-empted as a barrier to competition under Section 253(a) of TA-96. The OCA also claims that the Chapter 30 offer adds nothing to those obligations already required by Chapter 30.⁽³⁰⁾

The PCTA opposes the Section 251(f)(2) suspension for many of the same reasons as the OCA. The PCTA is particularly concerned about the relationship between the rural exemption provisions of Section 251(f)(1) and the suspension request under Section 251(f)(2). The PCTA believes that any rural LEC providing or expanding video programming after February 8, 1996 should lose the Section 251(f)(1) exemption.⁽³¹⁾

Finally, Vanguard's comments oppose the Petition. Vanguard claims that Petitioners have not provided the evidence needed to justify relief, that Vanguard's pending arbitration request with the Commission will be impacted by today's decision, and that the harm Vanguard is experiencing because of Denver & Ephrata's refusal to resolve Vanguard's compensation request may be compounded by Denver & Ephrata's investment in competing mobile telecommunications services.⁽³²⁾

Disposition of the Petition. There are really four discrete classes of Petitioners. They are as follows:

(1) First Class Petitioners -- Rural LECs as defined under TA-96 and eligible for streamlined regulation because they have less than 50,000 access lines under Chapter 30. This class includes all petitioners except ALLTEL, Bentleyville, Citizens, Denver & Ephrata and North Pittsburgh.⁽³³⁾

(2) Second Class Petitioners -- A subset of the First Class Petitioners with less than 50,000 access lines whose petition also raises issues about the scope of their Section 251(f)(1) exemption. This class includes only Bentleyville and Citizens.

(3) Third Class Petitioners - Rural LECs as defined under TA-96 and not eligible for streamlined regulations because they have more than 50,000 access lines under Chapter 30. This class includes ALLTEL, Denver & Ephrata, and North Pittsburgh.

(4) Fourth Class Petitioners - A subset of the Third Class Petitioners who have more than 50,000 access lines but also have interconnection requests. This class currently includes North Pittsburgh.

First Class Petitioners. The First Class Petitioners consist of all the rural LECs with less than 50,000 access lines with the exception of Bentleyville and Citizens. We think that the First Class Petitioners provided the evidence necessary to sustain Section 251(f)(2) relief under TA-96. They have established the requisite showings of significant adverse economic harm, avoidance of a requirement that is unduly economically burdensome, avoidance of technically infeasible requirements, and that the relief is in the public interest.

Section 251(f)(2)(A)(i) requires a showing of significant adverse economic impact. We think the First Class Petitioners have made that claim in several respects. The First Class Petitioners need additional time to facilitate competition and network deployment because, given the resource constraints they face, significant adverse economic harm will result if we immediately subject them to competition. The First Class Petitioners simply need more time to facilitate competition when compared to the larger LECs. In addition, the denial of relief will require the rural LECs to devote their scarce resources addressing complex matters that are more easily addressed by the larger LECs. Finally, the rural LECs' more limited resources, based on our experience with these LECs, are better spent focused on promoting competition and network deployment instead of litigating uncertain legal requirements before appellate review has established those requirements' parameters.

Section 251(f)(2)(A)(ii) requires a showing that relief is necessary to avoid imposing an unduly economically burdensome requirement. We think the Petitioners have established that in several ways. The rural LECs must, based on our experience, often choose between litigation and network deployment because of their limited resources. The resources they devote to litigating uncertain federal requirements are resources that are unavailable to facilitate competition and network deployment as envisioned by Chapter 30 and TA-96. Our denial of any Section 251(f)(2) relief will require the rural LECs to engage in costly litigation at the same pace as the larger LECs.

We do not think that either Congress or the General Assembly imposed compliance requirements at the same time and at the same pace for rural and non-rural LECs given the reasoned distinction, in TA-96 and Chapter 30, between rural and non-rural LECs. We do not think that either Congress or the General Assembly intended to mandate that the rural LECs' participate in complex proceedings at the time and at the same pace given the fact, drawn from regulatory experience, that rural LECs do not have the same resource base and typically implement requirements only after they have been litigated by the larger LECs. Moreover, the costs they face are significantly more than the normal costs incidental to competition.⁽³⁴⁾

Section 251(f)(2)(A)(iii) requires a showing that relief is necessary to avoid imposing a requirement that is technically infeasible. We believe the Petitioners have made that showing in several respects.

For one thing, the larger LECs are engaged in expensive and time consuming litigation regarding the technical requirements for pricing unbundled network elements, number portability, database access, and billing and collection services. The Petitioners, however, generally lack the resources to address the technical feasibility of solving such problems. We think that the reasoned distinction between rural and non-rural LECs made in Chapter 30 and TA-96 was made for this obvious reason.

Moreover, the denial of Section 251(f)(2) relief would not be consistent with Chapter 30. The rural LECs can take the time provided by this relief and proceed apace to compliance with the alternative regulation and network deployment requirements of Chapter 30.

Finally, Section 251(f)(2)(B) requires a showing that any Section 251(f)(2) relief be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. We conclude that the Petitioners have shown the need for Section 251(f)(2) relief in order to comply with the competitive choice and network deployment goals of TA-96 and Chapter 30. However, we do not agree with Petitioners that the absolute 5-year prohibition on competition is consistent with Section 251(f)(2)(b). We believe that the more-limited relief we provide is a better fit with the public interest, convenience, and necessity because it narrows the time frame necessary to facilitate competition and network deployment.

A further fact supporting our Section 251(f)(2) relief is the fact that MCI, a major competitor in the local exchange market, does not oppose a limited-duration 2-year suspension under Section 251(f)(2). However, MCI rightly opposes relaxation of any Section 251(a) requirements or any blanket 5-year prohibition on competition.⁽³⁵⁾

Second Class Petitioners. The Second Class Petitioners consist of those rural LECs with less than 50,000 access lines whose video programming operations raise Section 251(f)(1) issues. This class consists of Bentleyville and Citizens. We think the Second Class Petitioners have raised questions sufficient to warrant intervention but insufficient to justify Section 251(f)(2) relief. We take this position for several reasons.

The comments provided an extensive rumination on the interplay of Section 251(f)(1)'s exemption and Section 251(f)(2)'s suspension or modification provisions. However, the parties providing those comments did not provide adequate evidence supporting any conclusive determination in this proceeding. In addition, the comments were far more developed with regard to rural LECs without video programming operations than with regard to rural LECs with those operations. The vast majority of the Petitioners have no video programming operations. Their Section 251(f)(2) relief should not be delayed because of complex Section 251(f)(1) concerns unrelated to their situation.

We think the parties most concerned with the complex issues surrounding Section 251(f)(1) and 251(f)(2) should resolve those concerns in another proceeding. Consequently, we are denying both Bentleyville and Citizens any relief in this proceeding although that denial is without prejudice. Our action allows Bentleyville and Citizens to address their Section 251(f)(2) relief in more appropriate proceedings,

Moreover, Bentleyville and Citizens can secure a temporary stay with regard to any interconnection requests under Section 251(b) or (c), as permitted under Section 251(f)(2), pending resolution of their Section 251(f)(2) requests by filing a Section 251(f)(2) request within 30 days of entry of this Opinion and Order. We think this action is warranted in order to resolve the Section 251(f)(1) and 251(f)(2) questions without being diverted by other interconnection matters.⁽³⁶⁾

The Third Class Petitioners. The Third Class Petitioners consist of those rural LECs with more than 50,000 access lines who have no video programming services. The Third Class Petitioners consist of ALLTEL, Denver & Ephrata, and North Pittsburgh.

We think that Denver & Ephrata and North Pittsburgh, but not ALLTEL, warrant Section 251(f)(2) relief. North Pittsburgh and Denver & Ephrata, however, are discussed separately because they have pending interconnection or arbitration requests.

We must resolve two ancillary issues involving the Third Class Petitioners' request for Section 251(f)(2) relief. These two questions are 1) the rationale used to evaluate the request for Section 251(f)(2) relief; and 2) what the scope of the interconnection requirements should be for Third Class Petitioners.

We must develop a rationale for addressing the Third Class Petitioners request because, unlike the First and Second Class Petitioners, they all have access lines above 50,000. Our TA-96 Implementation Order, however, was largely confined to the interconnection requirements for rural LECs with less than 50,000 access lines.⁽³⁷⁾ Moreover, in our Commonwealth Chapter 30 decision, we applied the reasoning for LECs with less than 50,000 access lines under Chapter 30 on behalf of a LEC with more than 50,000 access lies.⁽³⁸⁾

We think that the rationale used in our TA-96 Implementation Order and the Commonwealth Chapter 30 decisions is relevant here. The Third Class Petitioners, even if they nominally have access lines greater than 50,000, have operations and resources more akin to a rural LEC with less than 50,000 access liens.

For example, ALLTEL has 211,563 access lines, North Pittsburgh has 62,107 access lines and Denver & Ephrata has 51,289 access lines. They collectively provide service to 324,959 access lines out of Pennsylvania's 7,661,632 access lines. Moreover, the entire class of rural LECs provides service to 1,687,010 access lines. That figure pales compared to Pennsylvania's largest LEC which has 5,975,019 of the Commonwealth's 7,661,632 access lines. The Third Class Petitioners are much smaller than Pennsylvania's largest LEC and are also smaller than most of the largest LECs in the class of LECs with more than 50,000 access lines.⁽³⁹⁾

Denver & Ephrata and North Pittsburgh are even smaller than ALLTEL. They serve none of the counties serving the Commonwealth's major metropolitan centers. They are minute when contrasted with Pennsylvania's largest LEC -- which has 5,975,019 of the Commonwealth's 7,661,632 access lines. Their minute size does not translate into having the resources to respond as effectively to legislative changes as the larger LECs in their class.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The second question is what the scope of any interconnection requirement should be for rural LECs with more than 50,000 access lines. We must address that question here because, in our TA-96 Implementation Order, we only required use of the consolidated application process for rural LECs with less than 50,000 access lines. The TA-96 Implementation Order left open the question of whether the consolidated procedure should apply to LECs with more than 50,000 access lines and our Commonwealth Chapter 30 decision applied streamlined LEC concepts to a larger LEC even though we denied a similar Section 251(f)(2) request.⁽⁴¹⁾

We conclude that requiring the consolidated procedures for interconnection should be extended to the rural LECs with more than 50,000 access lines in this proceeding. These rural LECs share similar concerns with universal service to the extent that the migration of high-volume users from their sparsely populated service territory could mean significantly higher prices for the remaining customers. Higher prices would have a negative impact on universal service in rural areas.

In addition, these Third Class Petitioners are more similar to rural LECs with less than 50,000 access lines. Their operations necessitate some of the considerations normally reserved for small LECs under Chapter 30. That is because the implementation and development of an extensive network modernization plan and compliance with the pro-competitive policies of TA-96 are far more demanding and difficult for a LEC with access lines that are several magnitudes smaller than Pennsylvania's largest LEC with over 5,000,000 access lines.

Finally, the Third Class Petitioners do not serve the same population areas as Pennsylvania's largest LEC. The service territory of Pennsylvania's largest LEC encompasses two of the Commonwealth's largest municipalities and many other more numerous, even if less densely concentrated, population centers. The Third Class Petitioners collectively serve about 324,959 access lines -- a figure barely larger than the 309,616 growth in access lines experienced by Pennsylvania's largest LEC in 1996.⁽⁴²⁾

Consequently, we shall require use of the consolidated process set forth in our TA-96 Implementation Order for the rural LECs in this Petition. This requirement, however, does not mean that every Third Class Petitioner before us has automatically established a need for Section 251(f)(2) relief.

That brings us to our final question: whether the Third Class Petitioners have made the case for Section 251(f)(2) relief. We conclude that Denver & Ephrata and North Pittsburgh, but not ALLTEL, warrant Section 251(f)(2) relief although North Pittsburgh and Denver & Ephrata are discussed separately below.

We reach our different conclusion for ALLTEL for several reasons. ALLTEL is a larger rural LEC with many of the characteristics of the LEC in the Commonwealth Chapter 30 case. ALLTEL is similar to the other Third Class Petitioners because a part of its service territory is rural. These considerations, while sufficient to warrant requiring use of the consolidated process for ALLTEL, do not justify Section 251(f)(2) relief.

ALLTEL is unlike the other Petitioners because ALLTEL is similar to Pennsylvania's largest LEC. ALLTEL does provide service to the county serving Pennsylvania's third largest municipality i.e., Erie. The other Third Class Petitioners do not provide service to urban counties nor do they have access line totals anywhere near ALLTEL. ALLTEL's 211,563 access lines are several times larger than Denver & Ephrata's or North Pittsburgh's.

We believe that a rural LEC of ALLTEL's size and resources can be expected to provide additional evidence on its need for Section 251(f)(2) relief when compared to other rural LECs. We also think more evidence is needed in view of the fact that both the TA-96 and the FCC suggest that the purpose of Section 251(f)(2) relief is not to insulate rural LECs or inhibit competition.

Consequently, we are denying ALLTEL's request for Section 251(f)(2) relief because it is difficult to sustain on the evidence in this proceeding given ALLTEL's size compared to the other petitioners in this proceeding.⁽⁴³⁾ Our denial, however, is without prejudice. That allows ALLTEL to present a better case with more evidence on the need for Section 251(f)(2) relief, in light of its size, resources, and service territory, in another proceeding.

In addition, ALLTEL can obtain a temporary stay of interconnection requests under Section 251(b) or (c), as permitted under Section 251(f)(2), if it files a Section 251(f)(2) request within 30 days of entry of this Opinion and Order.

Fourth Class Petitioners. The fourth class consists of those rural LECs with more than 50,000 access lines, no video programming services, and pending interconnection or arbitration requests.

North Pittsburgh is a rural LEC with more than 50,000 access lines and a pending interconnection request. We think North Pittsburgh warrants relief for the same reasons set forth in our discussion of the First and Third Class Petitioners. We also think that the comments opposing relief for North Pittsburgh have not provided sufficient argument stating why North Pittsburg does not need any additional time to secure the resources to facilitate competition and advance network deployment.

North Pittsburgh has 62,107 access lines. The comments have not shown that a 12,107 difference in access lines between LECs with less than 50,000 access lines and North Pittsburgh somehow translates into having the time and resources to proceed to facilitate competition in the same manner as larger LECs with far more resources.⁽⁴⁴⁾ We conclude that North Pittsburgh warrants Section 251(f)(2) relief consistent with our discussion above.

We also believe that Denver & Ephrata warrants relief for the same reasons set forth in our discussion of the First Class Petitioners. Denver & Ephrata warrants relief because it serves none of the Commonwealth's major metropolitan centers. Denver & Ephrata has but 51,289 access lines -- only 1,289 access lines more than the 50,000 access line cut-off to qualify as a streamlined LEC. Moreover, Denver & Ephrata was eligible for treatment as a streamlined LEC last year. This minor 1,289 difference in access lines does not translate into having the additional time, resources, and sophistication needed to facilitate competition as quickly and as easily as a LEC with over 5,000,000 access lines or 200,000 access lines.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Vanguard's comments to the contrary are not persuasive. Vanguard's opposition is not based on any pending interconnection request to provide competitive services -- a major goal of Sections 251(b) and (c) of TA-96 and Chapter 30. Vanguard's opposition is premised on an inability to resolve an outstanding compensation dispute it has with Denver & Ephrata for services provided to Denver & Ephrata's customers.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Vanguard's compensation dispute is not, in our view, a sufficient reason for denying Denver & Ephrata the relief it needs to facilitate the competition and network modernization envisioned by TA-96 and Chapter 30.

Moreover, we have denied the Petitioners' request for suspension of any facilities-based competition under Section 253(b) in light of the filed comments. Our denial effectively allows facilities-based competition to proceed apace and will, we think, allow Vanguard to meet any putative challenge from any wireless joint ventures being developed by Denver & Ephrata. Also, Vanguard can monitor subsequent developments with Denver & Ephrata, including compliance with this Opinion and Order, and urge different Commission action based on those developments.

Finally, Denver & Ephrata is not being relieved of all fundamental obligations under TA-96 in perpetuity. Denver & Ephrata is only being given a limited relief similar to that suggested by MCI -- a major competitor in the local exchange markets. Denver & Ephrata is not being insulated from competition nor is our relief inconsistent with the FCC's Interconnection Order.

Nature of the Relief. We must now determine the Section 251(f)(2) relief best suited for the Petitioners. We conclude that a 2-year suspension from the requirements of Section 251(b) or (c) is reasonable and consistent with TA-96 and Chapter 30. We further determine that the rural LECs should be given the opportunity to seek, at the expiration of that 2-year period, up to three discrete 1-year extensions.

We believe that our relief, as set forth above, facilitates customer choice in rural Pennsylvania. By granting relief, we are giving Petitioners' an opportunity to promote competitive choice by using an advanced telecommunications network. Such a network, we think, would be far better for competitive choice than the existing network.

Our Section 251(f)(2) relief is consistent with TA-96. It does not permanently ban competition in rural Pennsylvania. Our Section 251(f)(2) relief merely suspends the Section 251(b) or (c) interconnection obligations with a 2-year limited-duration stay and an option for up to three 1-year extensions. A temporary suspension is not a permanent prohibition on competition in rural Pennsylvania.

Our Section 251(f)(2) relief is sustainable under TA-96. It does not provide the absolute 5-year prohibition on all forms of competition requested by the Petitioners. Our relief provides a limited 2-year stay and minor extension options based on MCI's suggestion, as a major potential competitor in the local exchange markets, that a 2-year suspension may be warranted. Our relief is also fashioned with a view to the FCC's concern, expressed in its Interconnection Order at paragraph 1262, that Section 251(f)(2) relief not insulate rural LECs from competition. Our relief strikes a balance between the needs of rural LECs for time to facilitate competition and network deployment under TA-1996 and Chapter 30 with the competing and equally legitimate concerns of competitors for access to rural Pennsylvania customers.

Our Section 251(f)(2) relief is reasonable under TA-96. It facilitates competition and deployment of an advanced telecommunications network -- goals envisioned by TA-96 and Chapter 30. Our Section 251(f)(2) relief only provides the rural LECs with minimum time they need to facilitate competition over an advanced telecommunications network developed during this suspension period. We do not think that an approach which meshes state requirements with federal obligations, in this case Petitioners' Chapter 30 obligations with our Section 251(f)(2) relief, is inconsistent. That is because Petitioners are expected to use this federal suspension to proceed apace with alternative regulation, network modernization, and deployment of an advanced telecommunications network to the public schools, libraries, and other public facilities serving rural Pennsylvania.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Moreover, our Section 251(f)(2) relief is in the public interest. It does not insulate rural LECs from competition forever nor does it inhibit facilities-based competition. We have provided a very limited suspension because rural residents have as much a right to competitive choices as their more numerous urban compatriots even if, to be sure, a LEC's resources in rural Pennsylvania is a factor that impacts our approach. This suspension allows the rural LECs to facilitate competition over an advanced communications network in the same manner, and at roughly the same pace, as any urban LEC after taking into account the LECs' differences in size and service territory.

As an additional caution, we note that any subsequent relief sought by a Petitioner pursuant to this Opinion and Order must present competent evidence that such relief is necessary under Section 251(f)(2). A Petitioner requesting additional relief must demonstrate why it needs any additional time to secure the resources to meet the goals of TA-96 and Chapter 30. A Petitioner must also demonstrate what action it has taken to comply with Chapter 30's mandate regarding alternative regulation and network deployment. A Petitioner must further demonstrate what progress a Petitioner has made in deploying an advanced telecommunications network to the public schools, libraries, and other public facilities serving rural Pennsylvania.

Also, we are requiring that a Petitioner seeking additional relief file a notice with the Commission and the commenting parties in this proceeding not less than six months before expiration of any then-effective Section 251(f)(2) relief. We want these parties to participate in any subsequent proceedings, monitor the Petitioners' progress, and report any slippage to the Commission. The Commission could then, depending on the circumstances, revoke any Section 251(f)(2) relief if we are convinced that our Section 251(f)(2) relief is being used to prohibit, as opposed to facilitate, competition and deployment of an advanced telecommunications network in rural Pennsylvania.

Finally, we are denying Petitioners' request for a 5-year prohibition on facilities-based competition. We do not agree with Petitioners that an absolute prohibition on facilities-based competition is necessary to facilitate competition and deployment of an advanced telecommunications network. In fact, Bentleyville Telephone has itself suggested that it might not be opposed to facilities-based competition.

We also do not agree with Petitioners that relief from the facilities-based competition envisioned by TA-96 and Chapter 30 enhances a rural LEC's ability to comply with TA-96 and Chapter 30. A competitor willing to provide alternative service over distinctly independent networks, as opposed to interconnection with the Petitioners' network, is not directly related to any Section 251(f)(2) relief. Any rural LEC which thinks it needs that relief can make such a case in its Chapter 30 filings.

Taken in toto, we conclude that our Section 251(f)(2) relief is in the public interest and consistent with the requirements of Section 251(f)(2)(A) and (B) because it strikes a fair balance between the need to facilitate choice with the delivery capacity of the rural LEC. We do so in light of the fact that rural LECs do need more time to secure the resources needed to implement any telecommunications policy. That reality, based on our considerable experience with Pennsylvania's rural LECs, also extends to implementing the policies of TA-96 and Chapter 30.

Miscellaneous Issues. The comments and reply comments also raise several other issues. The first issue concerns the impact of the Petitioners' Chapter 30 offer. The Petitioners offer to file their Chapter 30 proceeding by July 1997 or otherwise explain why they are unnecessary in exchange for Section 251(f)(2) relief. We do not think that offer sufficient under Section 251(f)(2) or 253(b). An offer to perform an obligation already required under state law does not justify federal relief.

The second issue concerns whether the Section 251(f)(2) relief is a barrier to entry under Section 253(a).⁽⁴⁸⁾ We conclude that it is not.

Section 253(a) and (b) of TA-96 provides as follows:

Section 253. Removal of Barriers to Entry.

(a) In General. No state or local statute may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide for any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.

(b) State Regulatory Authority. Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, and ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.

Emphasis Added.

The FCC's Interconnection Order also provides as follows:

1262. Congress generally intended the requirements in Section 251 to apply to carriers across the country, but Congress recognized that in some cases, it might be unfair or inappropriate to apply all of the requirements to smaller or rural telephone companies. We believe that Congress intended exemption, suspension, or modification of the section 251 requirements to be the exception rather than the rule, and to apply only to the extent, and for the period of time, that policy considerations justify such exemption, suspension, or modification. We believe that Congress did not intend to insulate smaller or rural LEC communities from competition, and thereby prevent subscribers in those communities from obtaining the benefits of competitive local exchange service.

1263. Given the pro-competitive focus of the 1996 Act, we find that rural LECs must prove to the state commission that they should continue to be exempt pursuant to section 251(f)(1) from requirements of section 251(c), once a bona-fide interconnection request has been made, and that smaller companies must prove to the state commission, pursuant to section 251(f)(2), that a suspension or modification of requirements of sections 251(b) or (c) should be granted. We conclude that it is appropriate to place the burden of proof on the party seeking relief from otherwise applicable requirements. A rural company that falls within section 251(f)(1) is not required to make any showing until it receives a bona fide request for interconnection, service, or network elements. We decline at this time to establish guidelines regarding what constitutes a bona fide request. We also decline in this Report and Order to adopt national rules or guidelines regarding other aspects of section 251(f).

FCC Interconnection Order, pp. 634-635, emphasis added.

Our Section 251(f)(2) relief is limited in scope and duration. Our Section 251(f)(2) relief does not insulate rural LECs from competition or prohibit competition. We denied the Petitioners' request, for a 5-year prohibition, in order to facilitate competition in rural Pennsylvania. Our Section 251(f)(2) relief imposes notice requirements so that competitors can monitor a Petitioners' progress and provide advance comment on any Petitioners' request for relief subsequent to this Opinion and Order.

Also, our Section 251(f)(2) relief does not prohibit competitive choice for rural customers. Our relief only modifies the timeline for facilitating competitive choice. Pennsylvania's rural LECs collectively provide service only to 1,686,613 out of 7,661,632 access lines.⁽⁴⁹⁾ A limited suspension that allows them to facilitate competition is not an isolating or prohibitive barrier to entry. Moreover, our Section 251(f)(2) relief advances universal service. We are requiring that the consolidated process set forth in our TA-96 Implementation Order govern all rural LECs.

Finally, our Section 251(f)(2) relief requires the submission of evidence sufficient to justify any extension of our Section 251(f)(2) relief. We expect additional evidence to include, but not be limited to, network modernization plans when requesting any subsequent relief upon expiration of the 2-year period provided today. That includes the actual progress made in deploying an advanced telecommunications network to the public schools, libraries, and other public facilities serving rural Pennsylvania.

We conclude, based on the comments and our discussion above, that the burden of establishing the need for Section 251(f)(2) relief has been made and that our decision is consistent with the public interest and Sections 251(f)(2)(A) and (B) of TA-96, the FCC's Interconnection Order, and Chapter 30.⁽⁵⁰⁾ We reject other comments or positions to the contrary; THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the Petition for Intervention of Helicon Telephone Pennsylvania, LLC is granted.

2. That the Petition for Intervention of Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksberg is granted.

3. That the Petitions of Bentleyville Telephone Company and Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksberg for relief pursuant to Sections 251(f)(2) and 253(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are denied without prejudice.

4. That the Petition of ALLTEL Pennsylvania, Inc. for relief pursuant to Sections 251(f)(2) and 253(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is denied without prejudice.

5. That the other Petitioners' request for a 5-year stay of the requirements of Section 251(b) or (c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and a suspension of facilities-based competition, which is requested pursuant to Sections 251(f)(2) and 253(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 66 Pa.C.S. §§3002 and 3006 is denied.

6. That the Petitioners, other than ALLTEL Pennsylvania, Inc., Bentleyville Telephone Company, and Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksberg, are granted a 2-year suspension, dating from the date of entry of this Opinion and Order, from the requirements of Section 251(b) or (c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

7. That the Petitioners, other than ALLTEL Pennsylvania, Inc., Bentleyville Telephone Company, and Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksberg can petition for up to three one-year extension periods, dating from expiration of the initial 2-year suspension period set forth in Ordering Paragraph No. 6 above, from the requirements of Section 251(b) or (c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

8. That any Petitioner subsequently seeking additional Section 251(f)(2) relief be required to serve notice no later than six months before expiration of any then-effective Section 251(f)(2) relief upon the Commission, and all parties submitting comments in this proceeding, after consultation with Commission staff.

9. That Petitioners ALLTEL Pennsylvania, Inc., Bentleyville Telephone, and Citizens Telephone Company of Kecksberg are granted a temporary stay from the interconnection requirements of Section 251(b) or (c), as permitted by Section 251(f)(2) of the TA-96, pending resolution of any outstanding interconnection requests involving Section 251(f)(2) provided they initiate another Section 251(f)(2) proceeding within 30 days of entry of this Opinion and Order.

10. That the availability of any Section 251(f)(2) relief provided by this Commission be conditioned on compliance with 66 Pa.C.S. §3003(d) and deployment of an advanced telecommunications network in rural Pennsylvania -- especially with regard to the public schools, libraries, and other public facilities serving rural Pennsylvania.

11. That a Petitioner's failure to comply with Ordering Paragraph No. 10 be deemed grounds for revocation of any Section 251(f)(2) relief provided by this Commission.

BY THE COMMISSION

John G. Alford,

Secretary

(SEAL)

DATE ADOPTED: July 10, 1997

DATE ENTERED:

1. The Petitioners consist of Yukon Waltz Telephone Company, Venus Telephone Company, South Canaan Telephone Company, Pymatuning Independent Telephone Company, Pennsylvania Telephone Company, Palmerton Telephone Company, North Pittsburg Telephone Company, North Penn Telephone Company, the North-Eastern Pennsylvania Telephone Company, Marianna & Scenery Hill Telephone Company, Lackawaxen Telephone Company, Ironton Telephone Company, Hickory Telephone Company, Denver and Ephrata Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Bentleyville Telephone Company, Armstrong Telephone Company-Pennsylvania, Armstrong Telephone Company-North, and ALLTEL Pennsylvania, Inc. They are referred to collectively as the Petitioners hereafter.

2. Section 251(f)(2) of TA-96 allows a suspension or modification of the interconnection obligations set forth in Sections 251(b) or (c) of TA-96. In addition, Section 251(f)(1) of TA-96 provides an exemption from the interconnection obligations set forth in Section 251(c) although there is an exception to that exemption involving video programming service providers. We discuss our rules and these provisions of TA-96 in detail below.

3. Section 253(b) of TA-96 allows a state to impose, on a competitively neutral basis, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.

4. Section 251 of TA-96 governs the interconnection requirements under the federal act. Section 251(a) imposes general duties on telecommunications carriers. Section 251(b) imposes specific duties regarding resale, number portability, dialing parity, access to rights-of-way, and reciprocal compensation. Section 251(c) imposes additional duties regarding negotiation, interconnection, unbundling, resale, changes and collocation. Section 251(f) provides for exemption, suspension, and modifications of these Section 251(b) and (c) duties. The Petition implicates all these sections, with the exception of Section 251(a) which is not disputed. They are discussed in more detail below.

5. Citizens is litigating with Armstrong Communications over Section 251(f)(1). See Comments and Reply Comments; Re: Armstrong Communications, Inc. Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Docket No. P-00961127 (Opinion and Order adopted June 12, 1997), slip op. 4-5.

6. Helicon and Bentleyville are currently litigating the scope of Section 251(f)(1) of TA-96 in a separate proceeding. Comments of Helicon and Bentleyville; Application of Helicon, PUC Docket No. A-310519.

7. Sprint PCS allegedly has an interconnection request pending with North Pittsburgh Telephone Company. See Sprint PCS Comments, p. 4. North Pittsburgh Telephone Company qualifies as a rural telephone company under TCA 1996. In Re: Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, PUC Docket No. 00960799 (Opinion and Order entered June 3, 1997), p. 15.

8. See 52 Pa.Code §5.72.

9. Helicon is a video programming service provider in portions of Bentleyville's service territory. Helicon claims that Bentleyville's expansion of its video programming operations into Helicon's service territory after enactment of TA-96 removes Bentleyville's Section 251(f)(1) rural exemption. Bentleyville differs. See Comments and Reply Comments of Bentleyville and Helicon; Application of Helicon Telephone Company LLC for Authority to Provide Competitive Local Exchange Communications Services in the Service Territory of the Bentleyville Telephone Company, Docket No. A-310519 (Formerly at A-310351, F0002)(Application of Helicon).

10. Armstrong Communications is a video programming service provider in Citizens' service territory. Armstrong claims that Citizens lacks any Section 251(f)(1) rural exemption under TA-96 and that Armstrong is entitled to interconnection. Citizens differs. See Armstrong and Citizens Comments and Reply Comments; In Re: Armstrong Communications, Inc. Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Docket No. P-00961127 (Opinion and Order adopted June 12, 1997) (Citizens-Armstrong Litigation).

11. Petitioners Answer to Helicon Petition, pp. 1-3; Petitioners Answer to Citizens Petition, pp. 1-3; Bentleyville Answer to Helicon Petition, pp. 1-3.

12. Armstrong Comments, pp. 1-3; Armstrong Answer to Citizens Intervention Petition;, pp. 1-7. Armstrong is not a party to this proceeding nor was Helicon until today's decision. Both parties, however, submitted extensive comments on their claims.

13. Petitioner Answer to Helicon Intervention Petition, pp. 1-3; Petitioner Answer to Citizens Intervention Petition, pp. 1-4.

14. Petitioners Reply Comments, pp. 12-13.

15. These are not at issue in this proceeding. They will not be discussed further.

16. Sections 251(b), (c), and (f) are involved in this proceeding. They are discussed in more detail below.

17. In the Matter of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers; Report and Order, CC Docket Nos. 96-98 and 95-185, FCC 96-325 (August 8, 1996)(Interconnection Order); In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45 (May 8, 1997) ("Universal Service Order"); In the Matter of Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, End User Common Line Charges, Docket Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 95-72 (May 16,1997)("Access").

18. Petition, pp. 1-2.

19. Petition, pp. 11-13.

20. Petition, pp. 2-3.

21. Petition, pp. 22-23.

22. Petition, pp. 26-28.

23. Petition, pp. 23-28.

24. Petitioner Reply Comments, pp. 1-14.

25. Bentleyville Comments, pp. 1-10.

26. AT&T Comments, pp. 1-12.

27. Helicon Comments, pp. 1-8; Reply Comments, pp. 1-3.

28. Citizens Reply Comments, pp. 1-13.

29. MCI Comments, pp. 1-3.

30. OCA Comments, pp. 1-14.

31. PCTA Comments, pp. 1-14; PCTA Reply Comments, pp. 1-8.

32. Vanguard Comments, pp. 1-5, especially pp. 2-4.

33. Denver & Ephrata and North Pittsburgh have historically been rural LECs with less than 50,000 access lines. Their access line growth, although small when compared to Pennsylvania's largest LEC, now places them in the class of LECs with more than 50,000 access lines. Compare 1995 Access Line Report, p. 1 and 1996 Access Line Summary Report For All Incumbent Pennsylvania Local Exchange Carriers, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Bureau of Fixed Utility Services, p. 1 (1996 Incumbent Access Line Report). ALLTEL is not a LEC with less than 50,000 access lines. LECs similar to ALLTEL have, however, obtained the streamlined regulatory treatment reserved for LECs with less than 50,000 access lines. Compare 1995 Access Line Report, p. 1 and 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1 with Petition of Commonwealth Telephone Company for a Streamlined Form of Regulation under Chapter 30, Docket No. P-00961081 (Opinion and Order entered January 17, 1997), slip op. pp. 93-100.

34. By the same token, the First Class Petitioners will not be heard to complain, two years hence, that the final solution regarding their requirements are untenable because they did not participate in the underlying proceedings where those requirements are developed. A party that does not participate in proceedings on matters concerning it is hard pressed to establish that the result is an affront to due process.

35. MCI Comments, pp. 1-2.

36. We note the proceedings in Application of Helicon, PUC Docket A-310351 as well as our recent decision at the June 12, 1996 Public Meeting in Re: Armstrong Communications, Inc. Petition for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Docket No. P-00961127 (Regarding appeal from a staff determination). Either proceeding or even a consolidated proceeding may be an appropriate place to file a Section 251(f)(2) petition. The parties might also file a separate Section 251(f)(2) request that would stay these proceedings. In addition, the parties could also explore their concerns in this proceeding provided they stipulated to a willingness to go beyond the 180-day rule required by Section 251(f)(2) of the TA-96. The point is that there are a myriad of ways to resolve these complex questions even if the narrow focus of the Petition is not one of them.

37. In Re: Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Docket No. M-00960799, (Opinion and Order entered June 3, 1996)(TCA 1996 Implementation Order).

38. ⁰Petition of Commonwealth Telephone For an Alternative Regulation and Network Modernization Plan; Petition of Commonwealth Telephone Company for Exemption and/or Suspension of the Interconnection Requirements of Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, PUC Docket Nos. P-00961024 and P-00961081, (Opinion and Order entered January 17, 1997), slip op. pp. 93-100 and 161-162 (Commonwealth Chapter 30).

39. 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1; Compare also, 1996 Access Line Report, p. 1 for Bell Atlantic - Pennsylvania, Inc. and third class petitioners North Pittsburgh and Denver & Ephrata.

40. 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1.

41. See TCA 1996 Implementation Order, Docket No. M-00960799, (Opinion and Order entered June 3, 1996), slip op. pp. 7-9, 10-18; Commonwealth Chapter 30 Order, pp. 93-100.

42. 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1; Compare 1995 Access Line Report, p. 1 with 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1.

43. Our determination must not be read in any way to be a conclusive determination regarding ALLTEL's request. What we are saying here is that the quantum of evidence the other rural LECs have presented to justify Section 251(f)(2) relief is not sufficient for ALLTEL in light of ALLTEL's different size and service territory characteristics. That does not mean, however, that ALLTEL cannot make such a case in another proceeding. It does mean that ALLTEL has not made that case in this proceeding.

44. Compare 1995 Access Line Report, p. 1 and 1996 Access Line Report, p. 1 for LECs with more than 50,000 access lines.

45. 1995 Access Line Report, p. 1; 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1.

46. Vanguard Comments, p. 2, n. 1 and p. 3.

47. We note here that failure to comply with these express obligations will expose any nonconforming Petitioner to possible revocation of the Section 251(f)(2) relief provided today.

48. See, especially, AT&T Comments, pp. 4-11.

49. 1996 Incumbent Access Line Report, p. 1; Compare also, 1996 Access Line Report, p. 1 for Bell Atlantic - Pennsylvania, Inc. and third class petitioners North Pittsburgh and Denver & Ephrata.

50. See Section 253(a) of TA-96, ¶1262 of the FCC's Interconnection Order, and 66 Pa.C.S. §3001(1), (4) and (7).